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Sustaining Class Consciousness Across the New ‘Liquid Managerial Elite’ in 21st 
Century Britain 
 
Introduction 
 
This article poses an old question but resets it for new times. It asks how is class 
consciousness amongst the UK business elite maintained in the 21
st
 Century?  
 
It has been argued that dominant ‘ideologies’, ‘discourses’ or ‘meaning systems’ have been 
essential for societies to function, at least for the ruling elite if not for the wider population 
(Abercrombie et al., 1980). Studies of ruling classes or elites, which include business leaders, 
have then sought to trace the social and communicative structures that support cohesiveness 
as well as the predominance of certain ideas and beliefs. Typically such research has traced 
the reproduction of elite ideas through exclusive education systems and memberships of 
select social clubs. Studies of the business elite have also focused on patterns of corporate 
interlocks which link top companies at board level.  
 
The problem is that the make-up of and behaviours of the business class has changed 
considerably in recent decades. Accordingly, each of these mechanisms of social 
cohesiveness and reproduction have been steady declining in the post-war period. In recent 
decades, the combination of globalisation, financialization, the ICT revolution, and extreme 
market competition, have reshaped both the profile of the corporate elite and eroded their 
traditional mechanisms for social exchange. Accounts at the start of this century have 
recorded far fewer attending elite education or being part of corporate interlocks. Recent 
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studies now talk of a more meritocratic, mobile and fragmented business elite on both sides 
of the Atlantic (albeit a wealthier one too). 
 
At the same time, a range of studies continue to find a high degree of ideological coherence 
in the norms, values and beliefs of the new business elite. If anything such ideas have become 
stronger since the Thatcher-Reagan era and in spite of the many differences and tensions 
across the business community. Thus the question then becomes what are the new or 
alternative means by which such ideas and discourses are circulated and become widely 
accepted amongst corporate leaders? 
 
This study tried to answer this question using two forms of data. The first was a set of 30 
semi-structured interviews with top CEOs selected from FTSE 100 companies and the top 
100 private companies in the UK. The second was a demographic audit of all FTSE 100 
CEOs in 2014. The findings suggest that traditional views of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ or the 
‘managerial class’ are now outdated. The top tier of business leaders is now more of a liquid 
managerial elite. In consequence, three alternative means of achieving class coherence 
amongst the business elite have become more significant in recent decades. These have 
grown just as other forms have declined. The newer forms are: 1) professional education and 
identity (as opposed to elite education and class identity); 2) multiple and extensive semi-
formal types of social interaction (located between institutional interlocks and clubs); and 3) 
the role of mass and specialist media (used to maintain ideological coherence rather than for 
managing mass public consent). 
 
Sustaining Business Class Consciousness Amidst the Fracturing of the Business Elite 
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Scholars interested in class, elites and inequality have regularly engaged with the subject of 
elite ideologies, discourses and meaning systems (see Abercrombie et al., 1980). A sense of 
shared ideas, norms and values, amongst the top social tiers is deemed fundamental to 
maintaining unequal societies in all their manifestations. As Hill states (1990: 2): ‘What has 
been important for the stability of capitalism is the coherence of the dominant class itself, and 
ideology has played a major role in securing this’. Consequently, (Post) Marxists and elite 
scholars have thus sought to identify such elites and their core belief systems as well as the 
means by which they are circulated and agreed.  
 
In both classic Marxist and elite studies business leaders are assumed to be a core component 
of the top class according to a range of criteria. They either own or manage the means of 
production. Their average income is many times that of the general population. Their 
positions at the apex of large, hierarchical organisations gives them heightened power in 
terms of ‘command over resources’ (economic and social capital, labour power, political 
access). By occupation, they are located in the top tier of all schema for class stratification 
(see Maclean et al., 2010, Savage, 2015, for extended discussions here).  
 
At the same time, the exact make-up of the business or ‘economic elite’, and their associated 
class consciousness has varied considerably as capitalism has evolved. Power has shifted 
between landowners, mercantilists, industrialists and financiers, as well as between rival 
groups within those sectors. Accordingly, the social and cultural conditions of business elites, 
their sense of cohesiveness and particular ideological outlooks, have varied too (Grant, 1993). 
At different periods, that collective consciousness has been characterised as ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’ (Cain and Hopkins, 2000), ‘the managerial elite’ or part of a more international 
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‘transnational capitalist class’ or ‘neoliberal thought collective’ (Mirowski and Plehwe, 
2009). 
 
Regardless of such shifts and characterisations, critical scholars have continued to both 
document core elements of business class consciousness, and the social and cultural 
mechanisms by which it is generated. Through the 20
th
 Century, several key institutional 
elements have been identified, including exclusive education systems, institutional networks 
and elite club memberships. Data on each of these has been periodically collected. Domhoff 
(1967, 2014) in the US, and Scott (1979, 2014 [1991]) in the UK regularly recorded and 
discussed these elements in relation to those who ruled America and Britain respectively.  
 
The data most commonly collated on business elites was that on corporate networks and 
educational backgrounds (see, for example, Mizruchi, 1982, Scott, 1979, Useem, 1984). 
Networks of corporate interlocks tied together otherwise dispersed corporate leaders, with 
disparate interests and weak business associations (Grant, 1993). While the large majority of 
directors sat only on one board, an ‘inner circle’ were found to sit on several. Similarly, 
attendance at private schools and Oxbridge or Ivy League universities, was taken as an 
indicator of higher class and elite reproduction (see also Stanworth and Giddens, 1974, 
Fidler, 1981). In UK studies it was also clear that a large majority had attended one of the 
elite fee-paying ‘Clarendon’ schools, such as Eton, Harrow, Rugby or Westminster (see 
Stanworth and Giddens, 1974). In addition, studies attempted to identify other class 
indicators, such as parental occupations, hereditary titles, and memberships of exclusive 
social and sporting clubs. Thus, Useem (1984: 65-9) noted that 41.4 per cent of directors on 
two or more boards were also members of an exclusive London club, such as the MCC, 
Brooks or the Carlton.  
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Education, club memberships and corporate interlocks have continued to be logged and 
analysed in UK studies of the business elite (see Maclean et al., 2006, 2010, 2014, Bond et 
al., 2010, Bond, 2012, Cronin, 2012, Gonzalez-Bailon et al., 2013). Each of these factors, 
because they offer accessible data, are still recorded as indicators of business elite ideological 
coherence and reproduction, even if scholars now also look at additional social mechanisms. 
 
However, business elite attendance and membership of each of these institutions has been 
steadily eroding since the late 1970s. The role of corporate interlocks had been open to 
question for a while (see Pettigrew, 1992, Mizruchi, 1996) but, in any case, have been in 
decline in the UK and US. In the US, Mizruchi’s (2013) long-run post-war history of the US 
corporate elite is one of growing fragmentation and atomisation, while Useem’s (2015) data 
shows a marked reduction in directors holding outside directorships just the last decade. Both 
Scott (2003) and Moran (2008) observed a similar breakdown in traditional British business 
‘old boy’s networks’ after the 1980s. Longitudinal analyses of UK business interlocks by 
Cronin (2012) and Schnyder and Wilson (2014), clearly showed this to be the case between 
1983 and 2010, including amongst those key ‘big linkers’ of elite inner circles.  
 
Classic class indicators, such as parental occupation and elite education also appear to have 
declined amongst business elites. In the UK, the figures for private school, Clarendon and 
Oxbridge attendance all dropped significantly between the early 1970s and late 1990s (see 
Stanworth and Giddens, 1974, Maclean et al., 2006). Several recent studies of UK corporate 
elites (Bond et al., 2010, Bond, 2012, Cronin, 2012) have also come to question the declining 
role of ‘the club’.  
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In many ways, these changes reflect larger-scale social, political and economic shifts which 
have not only altered national political economies but also the make-up and associated class 
consciousness of contemporary business elites. Globalization has moved commerce and 
corporations beyond the nation state, making business elites more international and mobile 
(see Wedel, 2009, Freeland, 2012, Birtchnell, J and Caletrio, 2014, Tsingou, 2015). A more 
transnational elite class is less likely to contain shared backgrounds linked to nation-bound 
elite schools, universities and clubs. They, along with the exigencies of ‘turbo-charged 
neoliberalism’ have also made business management far more ‘fragmented’, dispersed across 
devolved production networks and ‘liquid’ (Sennett, 2006, Bauman, 2007, Naim, 2013). 
Corporate life itself is also more ‘precarious’, impersonal and fleeting. Thus, Maclean et al.’s 
study (2006: 143), found that some 45.4 per cent of UK executive directors and 57.4% of 
non-executive directors of top 100 companies had left over a five year period (1998 to 2003). 
Freeland (2012: 53) noted that the average tenure of a Fortune 500 CEO has fallen from 9.5 
years to 3.5 over a decade. Financialization has dramatically changed the balance of power 
between finance and industry, reorienting business elites towards achieving ‘shareholder 
value’, distancing them from state elites and their employees (Savage and Williams, 2008, 
Mizruchi, 2013, Palley, 2013). 
 
In effect, the new business elite, although wealthier than ever, is harder to characterise as a 
stable, distinctive social ‘class’ that reproduces itself through the generations. As several have 
noted in the UK case (Scott, 2003, Moran, 2008, Savage et al., 2015) the era of ‘gentlemanly 
capitalism’, with its aristocratic mores and exclusive institutional spaces, is long gone.  
 
All this leaves a conundrum because while corporate elites appear to be fragmenting, 
business class consciousness and cohesion frequently appear as strong as ever. Business 
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leader consensus on a number of norms, values and beliefs continue to be recorded. The 
strong business ideas detected by Fidler (1981) in the early 1980s had become more 
consolidated by the 1990s (Hill, 1990, Lazar, 1990, Boswell and Peters, 1997). By this 
century, they appear to have become rather stronger still, in spite of the financial crisis of 
2007-08 and the worldwide recession that has followed (see XXX, 2007, Mirowski and 
Plehwe, 2009, Crouch, 2011, Tsingou, 2015). 
 
In all of these accounts UK business elites show strong differences in some areas but, at the 
same time, also display an enduring set of core beliefs. Essentially, they have united around 
an anti-state, pro-market ideology. Anything which hinders markets, such as collectivism, 
strong unions, and greater state intervention, through taxation, regulation or redistribution, is 
deemed negative. In contrast, privatisation, competition, deregulation and lower taxes are 
regarded as positive. There are also a number of related beliefs, about corporate governance, 
labour and consumer rights, pay levels, the market allocation of capital, globalisation and free 
trade, and so on.  
 
At times there is a remarkably high degree of consensus around views on politics, business 
philosophies and economic management. Thus, Lazar’s (1990) study of corporate leaders in 
the City found that 86 per cent were aligned to the broad ideology outlined above (see also 
Hill, 1990). Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) record a strong degree of consensus across 
business management texts about corporate management best practices in the 1960s and 
1990s. For example, in the 1990s, universally, top-down hierarchies were scorned and 
flexible networks were proclaimed, and constant change and globalization embraced. Savage 
et al. (2015: 323) found that CEOs of the new ‘wealth elite’ ‘is fundamentally marked by 
meritocratic motifs’ (see also Khan, 2011). UK Business elite support for the Conservative 
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Party has been remarkably high and consistent. In 1987, 91 per cent of ‘Captains of Industry’ 
voted Conservative and 1 per cent voted Labour (MORI, 1987). In 1997, the year of New 
Labour’s landslide election, 69 per cent voted Conservative and 7 per cent Labour (MORI, 
1997). In early 2015, prior to the election, 87 per cent wanted a Conservative or 
Conservative-led government and 6 per cent a Labour one (Ipsos MORI, 2015). 
 
At the same time, the UK and US have continued to produce policy regimes that adhere to 
this wider ideology that favours business leaders and financialization (Mirowski and Plehwe, 
2009, Crouch, 2011, Tsingou, 2015). They have brought significant rises in CEO pay, all 
while average incomes have stagnated or declined in real terms (see High Pay, 2015). This in 
itself suggests a high degree of ideological coherence across the business elite community as 
well as influence over the state. 
 
Thus, we are left seeking new answers to an old question. If the traditional social, cultural 
and institutional means by which business elites are reproduced, and its ideologies manifested 
and circulated, have been significantly eroded, then how is that cohesion and consensus 
produced? 
 
The UK Business Elite in 2014 
 
The study collected two forms of data on the business elite in 2014. The first was a series of 
semi-structured interviews with 30 people who were or had recently been top CEOs. 20 were 
FTSE 100 CEOs and 10 were CEOs of Sunday Times Top Track 100 Companies, as ranked 
by sales. The 30 were selected as a purposive sample, reflective of the distribution of industry 
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sectors in the two indices (e.g., manufacturing, finance, construction, retail, etc.)
1
. 
Interviewees were asked about a number of themes, including: on their background and 
upbringing, leadership and business philosophies, social relations and professional networks, 
information sources and decision-making processes, wider views on and relations with non-
business sectors (government, the financial sector, media, unions and communities). 
Interview lengths varied with most being 45 minutes to an hour and generated over 250,000 
words in all. Transcript material was then coded and aggregated.  
 
Many previous studies of business elites, including most of those cited here, selected rather 
larger samples, and the limitations of the study here need to be acknowledged. In defence, 
this is an extremely difficult group to gain access too with a limited pool of potential subjects. 
The sample here might be said to be the elite of the ‘economic elite’ or the central core of the 
‘inner circle’. At the same time, with such a small number, the data is likely to contain more 
instances of bias, be it in terms of demographics or personal opinions, practices, etc. Thus, 
the findings are limited and exploratory, suggesting future avenues for more extensive 
research rather than being definitive. 
 
The second form of data consisted of gathering demographic and biographical data on all 
FTSE 100 CEOs in post in mid-2014. Sources included entries for Who’s Who, World of 
CEOs, as well as Bloomberg and Business Week director profiles. Information collected 
included school education, higher education, postgraduate qualifications, nationality and 
tenure of CEO position. Most of this information was gained on all 100 CEOs, although data 
on school details and family background was too patchy to be included. 
                                                 
1
For FTSE 100 Plcs, the sectors were Finance (4 interviewees), Utilities (2), Media/IT (2), Pharmaceuticals (1), 
Mining (2), Consumer (3), Property (2), Manufacturing (2), Supermarkets (2). For top 100 private companies: 
Retail (2), Utilities (2), Construction/Engineering (1), Wholesale/Distribution (1), Manufacturing (1), Food 
Production (1), Entertainment (1), Finance (1). 
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To test the strength of business elite class consciousness, interviewees were asked their views 
on the UK economy, the state, the financial sector, and current levels of corporate governance 
and labour market regulation. In some question areas there were clear splits between private 
and FTSE 100 companies or within each cohort. There were also several unexpected findings 
that do not simply fit with a sense of business class consciousness.  
 
On the other hand, there were also clear signs of strong political and pro-market consensus. 
27 of the 30 made critical statements about the role of government in the economy. Half 
stated that politicians were ignorant of business and argued that the state needed to withdraw 
more from economic management. Half wanted more deregulation in a number of areas. 
More than half believed the state’s only role was to provide an infrastructure (education, 
transport, etc.) to support business. A third wanted immediate personal income and 
corporation tax cuts. Almost all of the 27 made two or more such statements.  
 
In terms of political alignment, almost four fifths were undoubtedly Conservative Party 
supporters. This came out in a mixture of public profiles and interview responses. Only one 
of the 30 mentioned supporting any other party. The alignment of the remaining fifth was not 
clear. So, in many ways, the interview cohort of 30 reflected the strong pro-market and pro-
Conservative Party views recorded in several studies over recent decades. 
 
Professional Business Education and Identity Over Elite Education and Class Identity 
 
The research findings reveal that the traditional class and elite educational factors that had 
once linked the British business elite have continued to decline. At the same time, this 
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decrease has been matched by a rise in those gaining a professional business-style education. 
From this material it thus becomes clear that current business leaders are more linked by their 
professional education and identity than they are by shared class backgrounds and exclusive 
educations. 
 
Each of the 30 interviewees were asked about their upbringing, as well as the ‘personal 
qualities, abilities and experiences that enabled them to rise and succeed’. Responses 
suggested that two thirds were from working or middle class families and one third from an 
upper or upper middle class home (seven were non-UK nationals). Just over a third went to a 
private fee-paying school (including a couple from modest backgrounds but with full 
scholarships). None attended one of the elite ‘Clarendon’ schools. Only three of the 30 had 
both a private education and attended an Oxbridge college, and only one of those clearly 
came from an upper class home. In fact, interviewees, when asked about their career paths, 
rarely said much about their school education and were keen to play down their birth 
advantages. Instead, in keeping with the contemporary business discourse of ‘meritocracy’ 
(see Kahn, 2011, Savage et al., 2015), they linked their rise to personal abilities, professional 
education, luck and determination: 
 
(Stephen Hester) ‘I went to a Yorkshire Comprehensive School and I was the first 
kid ever to actually go to Oxford ... in the ‘80s, ‘90s and arguably 2000s, finance 
the world over sucked in a vastly disproportionate amount of the world’s most 
able graduates, because it offered this internationalism, this meritocracy, this 
excitement, this pace and the rewards.’ 
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The 2014 audit of FTSE 100 CEOs also suggests a general trend away from elite education. 
Only 56 per cent were from the UK, leaving patchy information on class indicators, such as 
school attendance and parental occupations. Only 4 in total listed an elite ‘Clarendon’ school 
(Eton, Westminster). According to a 2014 survey of elites in Britain (CSM, 2014), 22 per 
cent of FTSE 350 CEOs attended a UK private school, 31 per cent attended a grammar or 
state school, and 47 per cent were educated abroad. 
 
Comparisons with earlier studies reveal a pattern of continuing decline in private school and 
exclusive Clarendon school attendance over a century (see Table One). Maclean et al. (2006: 
106, 117), using 1998 data on 501 UK directors, found that 43 per cent went to a private 
school, including 20 per cent who went to an elite one such as Eton or Harrow. Stanworth 
and Giddens’ study (1974: 84-5) of 460 chairman, between 1905 and 1971, recorded that 65 
per cent went to private schools, with 56 per cent overall attending Clarendon schools.  
 
It is a similar story with university education and Oxbridge college attendance. Of the 30 
CEOs interviewed, a fifth had been to Oxford or Cambridge. Of the 2014 cohort of FTSE 100 
CEOs, 17 per cent had attended Oxbridge colleges, 68 per cent another university, 12 per cent 
did not attend a university. This is in line with an elite survey (CSM, 2014), which found that 
18 per cent of FTSE 350 CEOs attended Oxbridge colleges. Once again, patterns of 
university attendance have shifted over the decades (see Table One). Whitley’s study (1974: 
70), using 1970-1 data, found that 50 per cent had attended Oxbridge colleges, 9 per cent 
other universities, and 36 per cent had not attended a university at all. At the same time, 
general university attendance at other universities has risen. Thus, whereas in 1970-1 85 per 
cent of business leaders who attended university went to Oxbridge, in 2014 only 20 per cent 
had done so. An elite education is still considered a key route to the top of the British 
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business class (Maclean et al., 2010, Savage et al., 2015) but the correlation between the two 
is now much weaker than it once was. 
 
Table One Here: School and University Education of Business Elites 1905-2014 
 
However, the interview material and FTSE 100 data both indicated that as elite school and 
university educations declined, so forms of professional business education rose. Amongst 
the 30 interviewees a third had economics in their first degree and a third had some 
combination of business studies, management and accounting. In total, four fifths had one of 
these subjects and/or an MBA. Indeed, a clear sense of a professional business education and 
identity came through in the interviews. As one remarked: (Warren East) ‘I always wanted to 
be a captain of industry, and at the end of the 1980s it was very fashionable to do MBAs and 
I reckoned that I needed that tool in the kitbag’. For another: 
 
(Charlie Mayfield) ‘obviously my job was going to be in some kind of business, 
one of the reasons I wanted to go to Business School and therefore I did a year at 
Cranfield ... I managed to get a job at SmithKline Beecham, which was a really 
interesting place to work; some great brands, some really terrific people. And I 
suppose having done my MBA ... I was then approached to go and work at 
McKinsey’ 
 
During interviews, references to management terms and professional business thinking and 
actions were common. 17 CEOs had some link to Harvard Business School, either having 
attended a course or reading the Harvard Business Review or similar publications. Harvard 
was mentioned 38 times in the transcripts. PwC (Price Waterhouse Cooper) came up 25 
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times. In contrast, despite four of the 30 having attended Cambridge, there were only 6 
mentions of Cambridge University. The terms ‘manager’ or ‘management’, although not put 
in the questions, came up 280 times. ‘Team’ came up 181 times as CEOs talked about team 
management, team building, and came up with sports team analogies. ‘Strategy’ or ‘strategic’ 
came up 168 times. ‘Risk’ came up 163 times. All of which suggested a strong sense of 
professional business/management self was more pertinent to their identity than their class 
background.  
 
These trends are mirrored in the 2014 FTSE 100 CEOs audit. 48 per cent took a first degree 
or attained another qualification in business management, economics or accounting (see 
Table Two). 29 per cent took a science or maths subject, including medicine. 15 per cent took 
law, languages, an arts, humanities or social science subject. In addition, 62 per cent had one 
or more professional postgraduate qualifications in business, management or accounting 
(including 38 per cent with an MBA). In total, 72 per cent had UG and/or PG qualifications 
in business, management, economics or accounting. These figures, compared to earlier 
studies, show a consistent rise in such subjects taken. Fidler’s (1981: 87, 100) study, using 
1974 data, reveals that 7 per cent had some kind of business degree and 22 per cent had taken 
a shorter course such as an MBA. 18 per cent had an accounting qualification. In total, only 
38 per cent had any kind of formal business qualifications or training at any level.  
 
Table Two Here: Professional Education of Business Elites 1974-2014 
 
Clearly, over five decades business leaders have become considerably more professionalised. 
Not only do some 88 per cent now attend university (as opposed to 59 per cent in 1970-1), 
but a much greater number, 72 per cent, have gained a business-oriented qualification (as 
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opposed to 38 per cent in 1974). The overall picture is one of a business elite whose social 
and cultural backgrounds are more closely linked to professional business education and 
identity than to elite and exclusive school and university educations per se (although these 
still contribute to a degree). In this respect, the ‘corporate class’ is guided more by the 
business ‘field’ (Maclean et al., 2014) and, as Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) presume, the 
‘new spirit of capitalism’ is to be found in business management texts. 
 
Multiple Semi-formal Types of Social Interaction Between Institutional Interlocks and 
Social Clubs 
 
Traditional studies have tried to account for the maintenance of business elite class cohesion 
through corporate board interlocks and exclusive social club memberships. However, in 
recent decades, not only has the ability of such common links been brought into question, the 
numbers of links and memberships have steadily declined (see above). Just as Pettigrew 
(1992) asked his ‘so what?’ question in relation to corporate interlocks, so Bond et al. (2010: 
18, 28) cast doubt on the importance of elite club membership: ‘social clubs might not 
represent sites of extensive interaction at all. They may only represent signals of adherence to 
... elite social standards and predispositions’. Cronin’s (2012: 177) recent review of the 
structures of the British corporate elite, also conceded that interlocks, schools and clubs ‘are 
only limited components of the taxonomy ... constituting elite cohesion’.  
 
If that is the case we are left asking: how else is corporate elite cohesion maintained? In a 
corporate world where top business leaders are more international, mobile and transient (see 
Wedel, 2009, Freeland, 2012, Elliott, 2014), stable, enduring and nation-bound 
institutionally-based social structures are likely to be less significant. As Wedel (2009) 
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describes, in relation to a range of elites, leaders are likely to operate within what she calls 
‘flex nets’ – flexible, shifting networks that operate across multiple sites and with personnel 
(or ‘flexians’) who come and go. As Maclean et al. (2014) also suggest, the corporate class is 
also required to move between business and non-business networks or fields. Such mobility is 
made possible because of new information and communication technologies, advances in 
transport, and the rise of multiple intermediary professions that serve and link business elites. 
 
The interview material, on which this next section is based, identified several alternatives. It 
revealed that there now exist multiple social forums that bring together corporate elites on a 
regular basis.. These are not fixed and institutional, as in the case of board interlocks. Nor are 
they tied to class-based, soft social club memberships. Instead, they are of a semi-formal and 
temporary nature but also far more frequent. Corporate elite cohesion and dominant ideology 
is generated and circulated by an ever increasing quantity of meetings and exchanges across 
the business community. Such engagements are more accommodating of the fragmented, 
international and mobile business elite of today, but are no less significant for generating 
consensual ideas.  
 
All 30 interviewees were questioned about their social relations with others. Rather than ask 
about boards or social clubs a more open question was put: ‘How and where do you meet and 
maintain key contacts in your business, industry sector and related sectors?’ The answers 
suggested that almost all CEOs were engaged in multiple meetings outside the firm, in varied 
social forums, both with business leaders and other elites. What came across, especially with 
FTSE 100 CEOs, was the density and frequency of meetings that took place that were seen as 
a core function of CEO life: (Paul Walsh) ‘the CEO title is probably now as much chief 
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engagement officer as it is chief executive officer, because there are so many groups that 
need to be paid attention to.’ 
 
Neither board meetings (interlocks) nor social clubs figured highly in the conversations. In 
fact, none mentioned social clubs at all in their responses. The social forums which were 
mentioned most, by just over half of interviewees, were business conferences, seminars and 
events. These were seen as flexible forums for exchanges of ideas and discussing issues. 
Many talked of the plethora of invites to such events that regularly came in: 
 
(Martin Sorrell) ‘I go to certain conferences each year, the World Economic 
Forum, Allen and Company in the Sun Valley, Google’s Zeitgeist, WPP Stream, 
Burning Man ... you [could] spend your whole life at conferences and you 
wouldn’t get any work done.’ 
 
The second most common response from half the CEOs was contact at professional and 
business association meetings and business lobby forums. The ideological function of such 
assemblies, conferences and events, have been documented elsewhere (see Miller and Dinan, 
2008, Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). Exclusive forums (Mont Pelerin Society, Davos), 
foundations, lobby groups and think tanks (IEA, American Enterprise Institute) have been 
considered as institutional means by which ‘the neoliberal thought collective’ developed and 
promoted its ideas. It was also clear in this research, that such events, regularly organised 
across sectors, were similarly useful in circulating contemporary business elite ideas, values 
and norms about politics and the economy: 
 
18 
 
(David Atkins) ‘So I think there is a responsibility to all in the sector to become 
engaged with EPRA or BPF or the British Council of Shopping Centres. And I 
don’t do it for any personal ego reason, far from it. I do it because I think it’s good 
for the sector, and ultimately it’s good for Hammerson ... what I think is as 
important is making sure that I’m tapped into the wider economic political 
circles.’ 
 
The third most common response, in terms of having exchanges with other business leaders, 
was direct business-to-business meetings. Just under a third of interviewees talked about 
these. The same number talked of maintaining relations via their positions on corporate 
boards (of relevance to the corporate interlocks position).  
 
Equally importantly, CEOs regularly attended meetings with other elite groups (e.g., 
government ministers, civil servants, financiers, head-hunters), often in conjunction with 
other business leaders (see similar accounts in Maclean et al., 2010, 2014). As well as 
bringing business leaders into contact with other elite groups, these meetings also provided 
forums for business leader exchanges and a consolidation of corporate ideas. These may be 
through unofficial government-centred business forums, or select events managed by one of 
the leading firms of accountants, lawyers or investment banks. As a recent High Pay (2015) 
publication noted, just four accountancy firms and five legal firms represent the vast majority 
of FTSE 100 companies in the UK. Firms, such as McKinsey, PwC and KPMG came up 
often in conversation, as did discussions of intermediaries from investment banks, corporate 
head-hunters and others. Such companies frequently initiated meetings and arranged social 
events that brought together groups of CEOs:  
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(Warren East) ‘I could go out to dinner in London every night of the week at some 
event or other ... Organised by consultants who are generally either sort of trying 
to sell something or they’ve sold something or they’re trying to sell something to 
government ... well typically if you’re going to sit down for an hour you spend ten 
minutes just generally chatting about the state of the nation.’   
 
In all of these forums there was a sense of frequent conversations about business, economic 
and related matters, that was both formal and regular, and also informal and ad-hoc. It is 
through these various venues that CEOs gain a sense of larger business opinion about the 
economy, society and political situation at home and abroad. Overall, three fifths talked about 
the personal business and expert networks they had developed over their career: 
 
(Mick Davis) ‘You should be talking to your peer group right across the stage 
internationally, locally or whatever. Other heads of organisations, not only mining 
companies, I think bankers, retailers or whatever ... A Chief executive of a FTSE 
100 organisation can meet whoever he wants to meet ... You go to dinners, you 
speak at conferences, and you build up a network. So as you build your network 
up, the value of a network is working that network, finding what people think.’ 
 
The findings of the interview material suggest that corporate board interlocks and elite clubs 
are now less significant social forums for generating business class consciousness and action. 
In this research, elite social clubs appeared of negligible importance and board interlocks are 
one of many means by which CEOs regularly meet and interact. Instead, perhaps the key to 
generating dominant business ideas lies more in the less recordable, less enduring and semi-
formal types of social interaction. Focusing on what CEOs actually do, how, where and with 
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who they communicate with, reveals that modern business leaders move rapidly across large, 
extended and flexible corporate elite networks, or ‘flex nets’ (Wedel, 2009). It is the multiple 
exchanges in a variety of forums that generates and circulates key ideas, business norms and 
wider views on politics and the economy. New ICTs, the availability of cheap, frequent 
transport options, and the plethora of corporate intermediaries, have all facilitated this shift. 
 
The Role of Mass and Specialist Media for Business Elite Coherence Rather than the 
Management of Public Consent 
 
The mass media has been relatively ignored in studies of business elites and ideology. Where 
the topic of capitalist ideology and media is discussed (e.g., Lukes, 1974, Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988, Philo, 1995), researchers have dwelt on the ways and means elites present, 
distort or conceal the world to larger publics. Over the years, the majority consensus of 
communication scholars has been that mass media has had a limited impact here (see 
overview in XXX, 2007). Consequently, media has rarely featured as a factor in the 
reproduction of corporate elite ideology in the UK and US.  
 
However, the role of mass and specialist media in elite deliberation has been observed in 
related literature. Habermas’s (1989 [1962]) described the historical contribution of the press 
and pamphlets in the creation of the early ‘bourgeois public sphere’. Parsons (1989) 
documented the role of the financial press in the adoption of first Keynesianism and then 
monetarism amongst economic and political elites through the Twentieth Century. XXX 
(2007) produced studies showing how political news media acted as a crucial medium 
through which politicians pushed and debated policy agendas. Similarly, Shiller (2001) 
documented the part played by mainstream business news coverage in pumping up the 
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dot.com bubble of the 1990s. All of which suggests that media might also be a key means for 
generating and circulating dominant business norms, values and beliefs across corporate elite 
networks. 
 
Interviews gave evidence to support this notion. All interviewees were asked about how they 
kept abreast of new social trends, business fashions and technical innovations, with more 
specific questions about the information sources they used. Interestingly, the top source, 
mentioned by 26 CEOs, was various forms of mainstream business news. This included a 
combination of daily newspapers and popular business magazines. Three fifths mentioned the 
Financial Times and a half The Economist. Half mentioned another newspaper and a third 
another business magazine: 
 
(Mark Wilson) ‘Economist ... FT, I mean I’d read, each week, a lot it over the 
weekend, I just pick up stuff. If I’m at the airport I’ll just go and get an armful of 
stuff and put it, and read it on the plane. Mainly business mags but also I’ll read 
stuff even like the Mail because I want to see what our customers are thinking.’ 
 
For many CEOs reading such mainstream business news was an essential activity. It was seen 
as necessary for keeping on top of current political and economic affairs as well as gauging 
social trends. Half, said they used a mix of mainstream news media and popular culture as a 
kind of ‘large-dish antennae’ to look for such wider shifts and trends. A proportion said that 
they got clippings files of news articles on their industry sector and company delivered to 
them personally each day: 
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(Ian Powell) ‘I get a lot of media briefs as well through our team, so anything of 
relevance if you like is reported through to me and summarised so that I can keep 
completely up to speed with what is going on ... it’s [delivered] every morning 
before seven o’clock.’ 
 
The second most mentioned source, by 25 CEOs, was other business people and expert 
networks (see above section). The third most common source was specialist press and 
business schools and consultant reviews. Three fifths regularly read trade press and/or analyst 
reports for their corporate sector. So, for example, five CEOs, who worked directly or 
indirectly with the food industry, read The Grocer trade magazine. Just under half also read 
the reports of one of the big name business schools, business consultancies or accountancy 
firms (although some avoided all such material too). A third mentioned the Harvard Business 
Review: 
 
(Gareth Davis) ‘I’m a regular business reader ... I always take a load of back 
copies of Harvard Business Review. Various, occasional publications and studies 
stuff from the accounting houses, various consultancies ... PwC, Ernst and Young, 
KPMG… they’re sent by rote to all FTSE chairmen and chief executives.’ 
 
The fact that the large majority of business leaders consume the same business news media, 
and the same specialist publications within a business sector, is very significant when put in 
the context of related research. First, many studies of news content have found that elite 
sources are reported and quoted far more than other kinds of source. In the case of business 
and financial news it is business leaders (Philo, 1995, XXX, 2002, Bennett et al., 2004). Thus 
XXX’s (2002) study of a large 1990s takeover found that just 2.8 per cent of sources cited in 
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425 national news articles came from outside the business world. With a few exceptions, the 
vast majority of CEOs interviewed, did talk to the media quite frequently and for a variety of 
reasons: (Andrew Owens) ‘whenever you see “industry sources”, it’s often me. So journalists 
use us for intelligence and background ... TV and radio, all the dailies, the magazines, they’re 
all, they will all come to us’. Indeed, many saw media coverage of them as a key part of the 
job that could not be avoided: 
 
(Stuart Rose) ‘top managers need to be on the channel, they need to be able to 
handle the media ... the day you stop being a chief executive or a prime minister 
or a leader, then you can go and behave privately, but when you’re in, you’re in 
public ownership. So I believe in you’ve got to, it’s part of the rules of the game’. 
 
Second, several content analyses of financial and business news have found that the agendas 
and frames of such coverage very much reflect typical elements of business elite ideology. 
Mitchell’s (1997) survey of business groups and trade unions noted that coverage was 
significantly more sympathetic towards business and critical of unions, so echoing earlier 
studies of the Glasgow University Media Group (Philo, 1995). Kantola (2006) studied the 
Financial Times’s coverage of 32 national elections between 2000 and 2005. In each case, the 
FT backed candidates which supported pro-market reforms, and were critical of democracies 
and leaders which did not (see also, Bennett et al, 2004, Durham, 2007). 
 
In effect, business news media is likely to be a strong means by which business elite opinion 
is generated and circulated. The news sources of such media, as well as the suppliers of 
advertising revenue, are mostly business elites. Consequently, business news is much more 
likely to follow business elite agendas and political frames. As the interview material 
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revealed, the large majority of CEOs both act as regular sources for, and consumers of, this 
same business news. It is the same with specialist publications in each business sector. Thus, 
it stands to reason that business elites are also likely to generate and reinforce key elements of 
a self-serving business class ideology in the process. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Contemporary researchers rarely ask now how corporate elite ideas are generated and 
circulated. Academic interest has turned away from ‘old fashioned’ concerns with agency and 
ideology. Real world shifts, from globalisation to agency-less new technologies, have 
appeared to make such questions increasingly redundant. That the traditional means of 
documenting business elite social cohesion, such as education and interlocks, have also 
deteriorated, suggest the topic has indeed run its course.  
 
However, as argued here, these concerns are as relevant as ever. Three to four decades of 
neoliberalism, in which business elites have continued to benefit quite spectacularly, suggests 
that those managing the economy have maintained a great deal of ideological cohesion and 
consensus. Despite a sense of increasing corporate mobility, insecurity and fragmentation, the 
ideas of corporate leaders continue to be fairly strong and consistent. This suggests that the 
question remains valid but the research parameters need updating. 
 
One research parameter that has changed is the composition, class consciousness and 
behaviours of the business elite themselves. In Britain, the age of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ 
has long gone. So too, the immobile career manager who stayed and worked their way up one 
company to the top, is far less common. Big firms are increasingly owned and run by foreign 
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firms and investors, and managed or advised by transient, mobile professional managers and 
technical experts. Both investment horizons and CEO tenures are far shorter. Companies are 
more fragmented and devolved. Under these circumstances, the business elite have less of a 
shared class background or enduring social and occupational networks. Consciousness and 
social cohesion is more developed through the ‘cultural capital’ accumulated in their 
professional lives: through business education, business publications and media, and their 
movement and experiences across business and related flexible networks. In effect, business 
leaders are still a top tier ‘class’ in terms of income, wealth and relationship to the means of 
production. But, in all other ways, they are more ‘liquid’ and distant. They are a liquid 
managerial elite, equipped for a more precarious and fast-moving form of capitalism. 
 
Accordingly, the means and mechanisms for sustaining business class consciousness now 
have changed too. As the numbers of elite-educated CEOs from upper class backgrounds 
have declined, so those with  professional business-style educations and related identities 
have grown. Although formal interlocks have been reduced, the number of flexible, semi-
formal meeting opportunities and forums for business leaders to exchange, have increased 
considerably. The role of elite-influenced media and digital communication  in shaping wider 
public opinion may not be that strong. However, its role in generating and circulating 
business ideas across the corporate community is likely to have intensified. All of which 
suggest that business elite scholarship now has a number of alternative social, institutional 
and communicative sites through which to explore business elite cohesion. 
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Tables 
 
 Private School % Clarendon % University % Oxbridge % 
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1905-711 65 56   
1970-712 74  59 50 
19743 74 23 58 38 
1998-994 43 20 - 29 
2014 225 46 886 176 
 
Table One: School and University Education of Business Elites 1905-2014 
1. Stanworth and Giddens, 1974, pp 84-5; 2. Whitley, 1974, pp 70; 3. Fidler, 1981, pp 84-5; 4. Maclean et 
al., 2006, pp 106, 117; 5. CSM, 2014; 6. XXX, 2014. 
 
 Bus Deg. % MBA/Equiv. %  A/C Qualif. % Prof. Qual. % Finance % 
19741 7 22 18 38 10 
1998-992 26    27 
20143 48 38 26 72 50 
 
Table Two: Professional Education of Business Elites 1974-2014 
1. Fidler, 1981, pp 87, 100, 102; 2. Maclean et al., 2006, pp 131; 3. XXX, 2014 
 
